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CAREERS IN THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

I. ASSUMPTIONS AGAINST WHICH RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE:

- a. The CS levels of pay today are based on GS schedules; clerical and secretarial groups and both male and female officers in the grades GS-9 to GS-11 are comparatively better paid than other agencies, including the State Department; i.e. advancement is more rapid and classification of jobs is more liberal because of factors peculiar to the CS.
- <u>b.</u> From the GS-11 grade up (and in terms of age from age 32-35) the rate of advancement is slower than in comparable positions in the State Department, i.e. an officer with approximately the same responsibility in State occupies a position classified higher than a comparable position in the CS. In other words, pay for senior positions of responsibility in the CS compare unfavorably with both the military services and the State Department.
- c. The CS has, in proportion to the total number of positions occupied by individuals with educations, abilities and officer-level career expectations, a limited number of executive (i.e. supergrade) positions. A young man seeking a career in the officer ranks in the armed services or within the State Department has a far better chance of achieving the responsibility, pay and status equal to that of a supergrade than the same officer would have in the CS.

d. The opportunities for the CS career officer to look forward to positions of prestige or status (important in the opinions of families and friends and ultimately to the officer himself, even if more than outweighed by the professional zeal of the CS officer) are even more restricted than the limited opportunities for becoming a supergrade.

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e. More than 50% of the members of the CS perform duties and work under conditions which are comparable to those of the rest of CIA and many other agencies of government; restrictions on their lives because of either cover or operational security factors are minimal. The career officers in this group do, however, have comparatively few opportunities to achieve executive positions (supergrades) toward the end of career. Many of them perform entirely professional intelligence tasks which require a high level of skills, educational backgrounds, and abilities. An incentive, in terms of end-of-career recognition with executive responsibility and status, is required for a greater number of this

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group to a degree equal to that for the group more directly involved in operational work abroad under conditions requiring continuing restrictions on their lives because of both cover and operational security factors.

- f. A smaller group in the CS (certainly far less than 50% of the members of the CS) carry out professional assignments over a long period of time (fifteen to twenty years and repeated tours in foreign areas) which impose distinct restrictions on their manner of living, offer limited career opportunities after middle age and fail to prepare the individual (in terms of experience, skills and contacts) to compete for senior executive positions in either private or government work outside of the CS. This relatively small corps of professional intelligence operatives is the group for which CIA provides the least attractive career. Because of the youthfulness of the CIA, and particularly of this corps of officers in the CS, this career problem is only now becoming acute.
- g. The entire CS has a "hump" of officers (and senior female secretaries who have moved in large numbers into intelligence officer positions without really having the potential to serve in the corps of intelligence officers described in paragraph f. above) who entered government service in the first half of World War II. Today the male members of this group range in age from 40 to 55 and have, with few exceptions,

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than 50% of them meet criteria applied to the group in paragraph f. above; a number of them (described as a group in paragraph e. above) are, however, extremely competent and should have some expectation for further promotion. This can be accomplished only by (a) expanding the number of executive positions in the CS and upgrading some of the existing GS-13 and GS-14 positions; and (b) eliminating through a reduction in force from the GS-14, GS-15 and supergrade ranks those individuals who are unable to compete with the best of the officers now pressing upward from the lower grades.

- \underline{h} . Some of the "hump" group do, of course, qualify fully for inclusion in any program designed to meet the career needs of the group described in paragraph \underline{f} .
- i. CIA (and CS) current arrangements for an officer eliminated through 701/702 procedures are unsatisfactory if we intend to use them beyond the present exercise. The present 701/702 program is particularly unsuitable if we intend to use it as a tool of management to eliminate from the CS individuals who, in spite of long service in CS operational roles abroad, have not been elected after reaching the age of 40 to be retained in the corps of officers who will

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continue in this work with increased pay and early retirement. The existing program is, compared to both State and Defense arrangements, entirely inadequate and the justification for more favorable separation settlements appears at least equal to if not greater than State or the military services.

II. OUTLINE OF A RECOMMENDED CAREER PROGRAM FOR THE CS:

- a. All staff employees of the CS should start careers with a common career program, pay scales and retirement benefits; this could be the present system of adherence to the GS pay schedules or to any other system adopted for all of CIA or for the entire CS.
- b. Promotions in the GS-7 to GS-11 professional positions which can be identified as those through which career intelligence officers normally move should be at a favorable pace -- presumably on the basis of automatic time-in-grade promotions on the basis of satisfactory performance. These promotions could be administered simply on the basis of record and the signed statement of satisfactory service and professional progress by the Chief of the major component of the CS to which the junior officer is assigned.
- c. Promotion of officers beyond the grade of GS-11 should be entirely competitive. All service at the GS-11

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level and in some cases service in the grades above GS-11 before the age of 40 would be competitive not only in terms of promotion but also in determining the future career status of the individual.

- d. A Clandestine Services procedure to determine the career plan for the individual after he reaches the GS-12 level (at the earliest) or the age of 40 (at the latest) should provide for a thorough and conscious reappraisal by both the CS and the individual of his future beyond this point. Three career possibilities should be considered:
 - (1) The individual and the CS can determine that he become part of the group of officers who will expect to continue service in operational work carried out primarily abroad. The individual in this group must consciously determine that he and his family are willing and able to accept any duty assignment, hazards, inconveniences and other limitations and restrictions characteristic of secret service operational duties in foreign areas.
 - (2) The individual and the CS can determine that he continue his career in the CS, look forward to either specialized and more permanent assignments at Head-quarters, and more limited opportunities for service abroad primarily with duties not generally associated



with CS operational activities. This individual should be able to look forward to ending his career at age 62, 30 years of service etc. having had the opportunity to achieve executive responsibilities commensurate with his service and abilities. This career would also be offered to technicians, specialists and non-executive positions which do not lead to more than middle-level salaries but can normally be carried out until normal retirement age, i.e. 62.

- (3) The individual could be eliminated from staff status in the CS in one of several ways: (a) conversion to non-staff status upon agreement between the individual and the CS, (b) selection out for cause, and (c) involuntarily separation from the CS as surplus to its needs, i.e. 701/702.
- e. The group identified under paragraph d. (1) above should be managed under pay and retirement arrangements separate from the rest of the CS. Pay should not be less than that received by comparable levels of the Foreign Service. Pay should reflect the lack of access, stemming from service and the nature of the work abroad, the individual has to business and investment opportunities to arrange for his own financial security after completing his career with the CS. Early retirement should be based on recognition that

the type of duty involved tends to burn out men faster than most other occupations. Retirement should also be based on the fact that beyond middle-age officers in foreign cover arrangements do not fit the cover. Also, a strain on family relationship becomes more acute as the intelligence officer's age, experience and ability become less compatible with his status and prestige in his cover group. Finally, the lack of senior executive positions within this element of the CS is at least as much a factor as in the CS as a whole.

III. IMPLEMENTING A CAREER PROGRAM FOR THE CS:

Actions required include:

- a. Establishment of a procedure for reviewing the record of each individual, to include consultation with him, to select members of a Foreign Intelligence Corps. The review should start with the GS-15's and precede downward through GS-12. Final determinations should be made on officers age 40 or over; immediate decisions need not be taken on officers under 40. However, where the officer under 40 clearly qualifies, it is recommended that he be admitted without delay.
- \underline{b} . New pay scales approximating those of the Foreign Service should immediately be adopted for the Foreign

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Intelligence Corps to replace the GS-12 through GS-15 schedules now used. GS-15's should be brought into the range of FSO 2; GS-14's should be related to FSO 3. It is my opinion that the GS-12 and GS-13 schedules are approximately at the level they should be and grades comparable to this should be maintained for officers brought into the Foreign Intelligence Corps at the GS-12 and GS-13 level.

- c. The DD/P should administer the Foreign Intelligence Corps and should either adopt existing panels or develop new panels made up of supergrade CS officers to deal with matters of selection into the Corps and promotion within it.
- d. The DCI should submit legislation to obtain authority to grant early retirement with an increased annuity for officers in the Foreign Intelligence Corps and for not more than 15 other officers per year selected by the Director from within the CS but not from the Foreign Intelligence Corps. (Something along this line must be done to handle the problem of retiring a limited number of supergrades each year. If we determine that the Foreign Intelligence Corps will include a range of grades shown in the attached chart, it is assumed that an officer at the top grade of the Corps who is promoted into the executive group will leave the Corps but retain his acquired early retirement benefits.)



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- The DCI should be asked to establish a new system of executive pay for the CS covering all of the senior positions to which both members of the Foreign Intelligence Corps and other groups in the CS can be promoted. Basically this should include the present GS-16 through GS-18 levels with one additional higher GS rating with pay comparable to the top FSO pay. A GS-15 from the CS who was not a member of the Foreign Intelligence Corps would simply be promoted to GS-16 or a comparable executive level established by the Director. A senior officer in the Foreign Intelligence Corps who could achieve a pay level equivalent to the top of an FSO 2 (\$17,030) in our Foreign Intelligence Corps would be able to perform most field assignments at this pay level and occupy many positions at an executive level at Headquarters while still retaining his Foreign Intelligence Corps status. A decision to retain this officer in the CS and to use him in one of the more limited higher executive positions could be accomplished by bringing him into the executive grade comparable to our present top GS-17 pay, i.e. \$17,570.
- f. A committee should be appointed by the DCI to look into other administrative arrangements, benefits, and special management devices which could be used to enhance the esprit and improve the morale and efficiency of the Foreign Intelligence Corps. In administering the Foreign Intelligence Corps, Approved For Release 2005/116446ARDP78-03091A000100020010-6



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mining the criteria for selection to the Corps. It is my strong conviction, however, that past service in foreign areas, demonstrated competence in languages, and a willingness and ability on the part of both the individual and his family to continue to accept assignments involving hazardous duty, health problems and personal inconveniences in matters of education, standard of living etc. should remain the major factors. It is admitted that there are many intelligence officers in Headquarters who make an equal contribution. I believe we would defeat our purpose if we attempt to solve whatever problems exist for this individual as we move to deal with the more critical problem of maintaining an efficient secret service abroad.

Attachment - 1
Proposed pay scale for CS

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